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Abstract
We present a compiler-based scheme to protect the confiden-
tiality of sensitive data in low-level applications (e.g. those
written in C) in the presence of an active adversary. In our
scheme, the programmer marks sensitive data by lightweight
annotations on the top-level definitions in the source code.
The compiler then uses a combination of static dataflow anal-
ysis, runtime instrumentation, and a novel taint-aware form
of control-flow integrity to prevent data leaks even in the
presence of low-level attacks. To reduce runtime overheads,
the compiler uses a novel memory layout.
We implement our scheme within the LLVM framework
and evaluate it on the standard SPEC-CPU benchmarks, and
on larger, real-world applications, including the NGINX web-
server and the OpenLDAP directory server. We find that the
performance overheads introduced by our instrumentation
are moderate (average 12% on SPEC), and the programmer
effort to port the applications is minimal.
1 Introduction
Many programs compute on private data: Web servers use
private keys and serve private files, medical software pro-
cesses private medical records, and many machine learning
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models are trained on private inputs. Bugs or exploited vul-
nerabilities in these programs may leak the private data to
public channels that are visible to unintended recipients. For
example, the OpenSSL buffer-overflow vulnerability Heart-
bleed [6] can be exploited to exfiltrate a web server’s private
keys to the public network in cleartext. Generally speaking,
the problem here is one of information flow control [28]: We
would like to enforce that private data, as well as data de-
rived from it, is never sent out on public channels unless it
has been intentionally declassified by the program.
The standard solution to this problem is to use static
dataflow analysis or runtime taints to track how private data
flows through the program. While these methods work well
in high-level, memory-safe languages such as Java [37, 40]
and ML [46], the problem is very challenging and remains
broadly open for low-level compiled languages like C that
are not memory-safe. First, the cost of tracking taint at run-
time is prohibitively high for these languages (see Section 9).
Second, static dataflow analysis cannot guarantee data confi-
dentiality because the lack of memory safety allows for buffer
overflow and control-flow hijack attacks [1, 2, 4, 11, 49, 54],
both of which may induce data flows that cannot be antici-
pated during a static analysis.
One possible approach is to start from a safe dialect of
C (e.g. CCured [42], Deputy [24], or SoftBound [41]) and
leverage existing approaches such as information-flow type
systems for type-safe languages [32, 50]. The use of safe
dialects, however, (a) requires additional annotations and
program restructuring that cause significant programming
overhead [38, 42], (b) are not always backwards compatible
with legacy code, and (c) have prohibitive runtime overhead
making them a non-starter in practical applications (see
further discussion in Section 9).
In this paper, we present the first end-to-end, practical
compiler-based scheme to enforce data confidentiality in C
programs even in the presence of active, low-level attacks.
Our scheme is based on the insight that complete memory
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safety and perfect control-flow integrity (CFI) are neither
sufficient nor necessary for preventing data leaks. We de-
sign a compiler that is able to guarantee data confidentiality
without requiring these properties.
We accompany our scheme with formal security proofs
and a thorough empirical evaluation to show that it can
be used for real applications. Below, we highlight the main
components of our scheme.
Annotating private data.We require the programmer to
add private type annotations only to top-level function sig-
natures and globals’ definitions to mark private data. The
programmer is free to use all of the C language, including
pointer casts, aliasing, indirect calls, varargs, variable length
arrays, etc.
Flow analysis and runtime instrumentation. Our com-
piler performs standard dataflow analysis, statically propa-
gating taint from global variables and function arguments
that have been marked private by the programmer, to detect
any data leaks. This analysis assumes the correctness of de-
clared taints of each pointer. These assumptions are then
protected by inserting runtime checks that assert correctness
of the assumed taint at runtime. These checks are necessary
to guard against incorrect casts, memory errors and low-
level attacks. Our design does not require any static alias
analysis, which is often hard to get right with acceptable
precision.
Novel memory layout. To reduce the overhead associated
with runtime checks, our compiler partitions the program’s
virtual address space into a contiguous public region and a
disjoint, contiguous private region, each with its own stack
and heap. Checking the taint of a pointer then simply reduces
to a range check on its value. We describe two partitioning
schemes, one based on the Intel MPX ISA extension [7],
and the other based on segment registers (Section 3). Our
runtime checks do not enforce full memory safety: a private
(public) pointer may point outside its expected object but
our checks ensure that it always dereferences somewhere in
the private (public) region. These lightweight checks suffice
for protecting data confidentiality.
Information flow-aware CFI. Similar to memory safety,
we observe that perfect CFI is neither necessary nor sufficient
for information flow. We introduce an efficient, taint-aware
CFI scheme. Our compiler instruments the targets of indirect
calls with magic sequences that summarize the output of
the static dataflow analysis at those points. At the source of
the indirect calls, a runtime check ensures that the magic
sequence at the target is taint-consistent with the output of
the static dataflow analysis at the source (Section 4).
Trusted components. For selective declassification, as re-
quired for most practical applications, we allow the pro-
grammer to re-factor trusted declassification functions into
a separate component, which we call T . The remaining un-
trusted application, in contrast, is called U. Code in T is
not subject to any taint checks and can be compiled using a
vanilla compiler. It can access all ofU’s memory, specifically,
it can perform declassification by copying data fromU’s pri-
vate region to U’s public region (e.g. after encrypting the
data). T has its own separate stack and heap, and we re-use
the range checks on memory accesses inU to prevent them
from reading or writing to T ’s memory. We give an example
and general guidelines for refactoringU and T in Section 2.
Formal guarantees.We have formalized our scheme using
a core language of memory instructions (load and store) and
control flow instructions (goto, conditional, and direct and
indirect function call). We prove a termination-insensitive
non-interference theorem forU, assuming that the T func-
tions it calls are non-interfering. In other words, we prove
that if two public-equivalent configurations of U take a
step each, then the resulting configurations are also public-
equivalent. Our formal model shows the impossibility of
sensitive data leaks even in the presence of features like
aliasing and casting, and low-level vulnerabilities such as
buffer overflows and ROP attacks (Appendix A).
Implementation and Evalution We have implemented
our compiler, ConfLLVM, as well as the complementary low-
level verifier, ConfVerify, within the LLVM framework [36].
We evaluate our implementation on the standard SPEC-
CPU benchmarks and three large applications—NGINX web
server [10], OpenLDAP directory server [45], and a neural-
network-based image classifier built on Torch [13, 14]. All
three applications have private data—private user files in
the case of NGINX, stored user passwords in OpenLDAP,
and a model trained on private inputs in the classifier. In all
cases, we are able to enforce confidentiality for the private
data with a moderate overhead on performance and a small
amount of programmer effort for adding annotations and
declassification code.
2 Overview
Threat model.We consider C applications that work with
both private and public data. Applications interact with the
external world using the network, disk, and other channels.
They communicate public data in clear, but want to protect
the confidentiality of the private data by, for example, en-
crypting it before sending it out. However, the application
could have logical or memory errors, or exploitable vulnera-
bilities that may cause private data to be leaked out in clear.
The attacker interacts with the application and may send
carefully-crafted inputs that trigger bugs in the application.
The attacker can also observe all the external communica-
tion of the application. Our goal is to prevent the private
data of the application from leaking out in clear. Specifi-
cally, we address explicit information flow: any data directly
derived from private data is also treated as private. While
this addresses most commonly occurring exploits [44], op-
tionally, our scheme can be used in a stricter mode where
it disallows branching on private data, thereby preventing
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implicit leaks too. We ran all our experiments (Section 7) in
this stricter mode. Side channels (such as execution time and
memory-access patterns) are outside the scope of this work.
Our scheme can also be used for integrity protection in
a setting where an application computes over trusted and
untrusted data [19]. Any data (explicitly) derived from un-
trusted inputs cannot be supplied to a sink that expects
trusted data (Section 7.5 shows an example).
Example application. Consider the code for a web server
in Figure 1. The server receives requests from the user
(main:7), where the request contains the username and a file
name (both in clear text), and the encrypted user password.
The server decrypts the password and calls the handleReq
helper routine that copies the (public) file contents into the
out buffer. The server finally prepares the formatted response
(format), and sends the response (buf), in clear, to the user.
The handleReq function allocates two local buffers, passwd
and fcontents (handleReq:4). It reads the actual user password
(e.g., from a database) into passwd, and authenticates the user.
On successful authentication, it reads the file contents into
fcontents, copies them to the out buffer, and appends a mes-
sage to it signalling the completion of the request.
The code has several bugs that can cause it to leak the
user password. First, at line 10, the code leaks the clear-text
password to a log file by mistake. Note that memory-safety
alone would not prevent this kind of bugs. Second, at line 14,
memcpy reads out_size bytes from fcontents and copies them
to out. If out_size is greater than SIZE, this can cause passwd
to be copied to out because an overflow past fcontents would
go into the passwd buffer. Third, if the format string fmt in
the sprintf call (line 16) contains extra formatting directives,
it can print stack contents into out ([56]). The situation is
worse if out_size or fmt can be influenced by the attacker.
Our goal is to prevent such vulnerabilities from leaking
out sensitive application data. Below we discuss the three
main components of our approach.
Identifying trusted code. Figure 2 shows the workflow of
our toolchain. The programmer starts by identifying code
that must be trusted. This code, called T (for trusted), con-
sists of functions that legitimately or intentionally declassify
private data, or provide I/O. The remaining bulk of code,
denoted U, is untrusted and subjected to our compilation
scheme. A good practice is to contain most of the applica-
tion logic inU and limit T to a library of generic routines
that can be hardened over time, possibly even formally ver-
ified [57]. For example, in the web server code from Fig-
ure 1, T would consist of: recv, send, read_file (network, I/O),
decrypt (cryptographic primitive), and read_passwd (source of
sensitive data). The remaining web server code (parse, format,
and even sprintf and memcpy) would be inU.
The programmer compiles T with any compiler (or even
uses pre-compiled binaries), but U is compiled with our
compiler ConfLLVM.
Partitioning U’s memory. To enforce confidentiality in
U, we minimally require the programmer to tell ConfLLVM
where private data enters and exits U. Since U relies on
T for I/O and communication, the programmer does so by
marking private data in the signatures of all functions ex-
ported from T toU with a new type qualifier private [29].
Additionally, to help ConfLLVM’s analysis, the program-
mer must annotate private data inU’s top-level definitions,
i.e., globals, function signatures, and in struct definitions.
These latter annotations withinU are not trusted. Getting
them wrong may cause a static error or runtime failure, but
cannot leak private data. ConfLLVM needs no other input
from the programmer. Using a dataflow analysis (Section 5),
it automatically infers which local variables carry private
data. Based on this information, ConfLLVM partitionsU’s
memory into two regions, one for public and one for private
data, with each region having its own stack and heap. A third
region of memory, with its own heap and stack, is reserved
for T ’s use.
In our example, the trusted annotated signatures of T
against which ConfLLVM compilesU are:
int recv(int fd, char *buf , int buf_size );
int send(int fd, char *buf , int buf_size );
void decrypt(char *ciphertxt , private char *data);
void read_passwd(char *uname , private char *pass ,
int size);
while the untrusted annotations forU are:
void handleReq(char *uname , private char *upasswd ,
char *fname , char *out , int out_sz );
int authenticate(char *uname , private char *upass ,
private char *pass);
ConfLLVM automatically infers that, for example, passwd
(line 4) is a private buffer. Based on this and send’s prototype,
ConfLLVM raises a compile-time error flagging the bug
at line 10. Once the bug is fixed by the programmer (e.g.
by removing the line), ConfLLVM compiles the program
and lays out the stack and heap data in their corresponding
regions (Section 3). The remaining two bugs are prevented
by runtime checks that we briefly describe next.
Runtime checks. ConfLLVM inserts runtime checks to
ensure that, (a) at runtime, the pointers belong to their anno-
tated or inferred regions (e.g. a private char * actually points
to the private region in U), (b) U does not read or write
beyond its own memory (i.e. it does not read or write to T ’s
memory), and (c)U follows a taint-aware form of CFI that
prevents circumvention of these checks and prevents data
leaks due to control-flow attacks. In particular, the bugs on
lines 14 and 16 in our example cannot be exploited due to
check (a).We describe the details of these checks in Sections 3
and 4.
T code is allowed to access all memory. However, T func-
tions must check their arguments to ensure that the data
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void handleReq (char *uname , char *upasswd , char *fname ,
2 char *out , int out_size)
{
4 char passwd[SIZE], fcontents[SIZE];
read_password (uname , passwd , SIZE);
6 if(!( authenticate (uname , upasswd , passwd ))) {
return;
8 }
// inadvertently copying the password to the log file
10 send(log_file , passwd , SIZE);
12 read_file(fname , fcontents , SIZE);
//(out_size > SIZE) can leak passwd to out
14 memcpy(out , fcontents , out_size );
//a bug in the fmt string can print stack contents
16 sprintf(out + SIZE , fmt , "Request complete");
}
1 #define SIZE 512
3 int main (int argc , char **argv)
{
5 ... // variable declarations
while (1) {
7 n = recv(fd, buf , buf_size );
parse(buf , uname , upasswd_enc , fname);
9 decrypt(upasswd_enc , upasswd );
handleReq(uname , upasswd , fname , out ,
11 size);
format(out , size , buf , buf_Size );
13 send(fd, buf , buf_size );
}
15 }
Figure 1. Request handling code for a web server
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Figure 2.Workflow of our scheme and toolchain
passed byU has the correct sensitivity label. For example,
the read_passwd function would check that the range [pass,
pass+size-1] falls inside the private memory segment ofU.
(Note that this is different from complete memory safety; T
need not know the size of the passwd buffer.)
Trusted Computing Base (TCB).We have also designed
and implemented a static verifier, ConfVerify, to confirm
that a binary output by ConfLLVM has enough checks in
place to guarantee confidentiality (Section 5). ConfVerify
guards against bugs in the compiler. It allows us to extend
the threat model to one where the adversary has full con-
trol of the compiler that was used to generate the binary
of the untrusted code. To summarize, our TCB, and thus
the security of our scheme, does not depend on the (large)
untrusted application codeU or the compiler. We only trust
the (small) library code T and the static verifier. We discuss
more design considerations for T in Section 8.
3 Memory Partitioning Schemes
ConfLLVM uses the programmer-supplied annotations, and
with the help of type inference, statically determines the taint
of each memory access (Section 5), i.e., for every memory
load and store inU, it infers if the address contains private
or public data. It is possible for the type-inference to detect
a problem (for instance, when a variable holding private
data is passed to a method expecting a public argument), in
which case, a type error is reported back to the programmer.
On successful inference, ConfLLVM proceeds to compileU
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Public Stack
Public Globals
Public Heap
34 GB
4 GB
gs.base
fs.base
4 GB
ᮈ Memory
ᮈ Memory
36 GB
Guard area
2 GB
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Figure 3.Memory layout ofU
with a custom memory layout and runtime instrumentation.
We have developed two different memory layouts as well as
runtime instrumentation schemes. The schemes have differ-
ent trade-offs, but they share the common idea – all private
and all public data are stored in their own respective con-
tiguous regions of memory and the instrumentation ensures
that at runtime each pointer respects its statically inferred
taint. We describe these schemes next.
MPX scheme. This scheme relies on the Intel MPX ISA ex-
tension [7] and uses the memory layout shown in Figure 3b.
The memory is partitioned into a public region and a private
region, each with its own heap, stack and global segments.
The two regions are laid out contiguously in memory. Their
ranges are stored in MPX bounds registers (bnd0 and bnd1).
Each memory access is preceded with MPX instructions
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(bndcu and bndcl) that check their first argument against the
(upper and lower) bounds of their second argument. The
concrete values to be stored in the bounds registers are de-
termined at load time (Section 6).
The user selects the maximum stack size OFFSET at com-
pile time (at most 231 − 1). The scheme maintains the public
and private stacks in lock-step: their respective top-of-stack
are always at offset OFFSET to each other. For each function
call, the compiler arranges to generate a frame each on the
public and the private stacks. Spilled private local variables
and private arguments are stored on the private stack; ev-
erything else is on the public stack. Consider the procedure
in Figure 4a. The generated (unoptimized) assembly under
the MPX scheme (using virtual registers for simplicity) is
shown in Figure 4c. ConfLLVM automatically infers that x
is a private int and places it on the private stack, whereas
y is kept on the public stack. The stack pointer rsp points
to the top of the public stack. Because the two stacks are
kept at constant OFFSET to each other, x is accessed simply
as rsp+4+OFFSET. The code also shows the instrumented MPX
bound check instructions.
Segmentation scheme. x64 memory operands are in the
form [base + index ∗ scale + displacement], where base and
index are 64-bit unsigned registers, scale is a constant with
maximum value of 8, and displacement is a 32-bit signed con-
stant. The architecture also provides two segment registers
fs and gs for the base address computation; conceptually,
fs:base simply adds fs to base.
We use these segment registers to store the lower bounds
of the public and private memory regions, respectively, and
prefix the base of memory operands with these registers. The
public and private regions are separated by (at least) 36GB
of guard space (unmapped pages that cause a fault when
accessed). The guard sizes are chosen so that any memory
operand whose base is prefixed with fs cannot escape the
public segment, and any memory operand prefixed with gs
cannot escape the private segment (Figure 3a).
The segments are each aligned to a 4GB boundary. The
usable space within each segment is also 4GB. We access
the base address stored in a 64-bit register, say a private
value stored in rax, as fs+eax, where eax is the lower 32 bits
of rax. Thus, in fs+eax, the lower 32 bits come from eax and
the upper 32 bits come from fs (because fs is 4GB aligned).
Further, the index register is also constrained to use lower
32 bits only. This implies that the maximum offset within
a segment thatU can access is 38GB (4 + 4 ∗ 8 + 2). This is
rounded up to 40GB for 4GB alignment, with 4GB of usable
space and 36GB of guard space. Since the displacement value
can be negative, the maximum negative offset is 2GB, for
which we have the guard space below the public segment.
The usable parts of the segments are restricted to 4GB
because it is the maximum addressable size using a single 32
bit register. This restriction also ensures that we don’t have
to translateU pointers when the control is passed to T , thus
avoiding the need to change or recompile T . Generated code
for our example under this scheme is shown in Figure 4b.
The figure uses the convention that ei (resp., esp) represents
the lower 32 bits of the register ri (resp., rsp). The public and
private stacks are still maintained in lock-step. Taking the
address of a private stack variable requires extra support:
the address of variable x in our example is rsp+4+size, where
size is the total segment size (40GB).
The segmentation scheme has a lower runtime overhead
than the MPX scheme as it avoids doing bound-checks (Sec-
tion 7.1). However, it restricts the segment size to 4GB.
Multi-threading support.Both our schemes supportmulti-
threading. All inserted runtime checks (including those in
Section 4) are thread-safe because they check values of regis-
ters. However, we do need additional support for thread-local
storage (TLS). Typically, TLS is accessed via the segment reg-
ister gs: the base of TLS is obtained at a constant offset from
gs. The operating system takes care of setting gs on a per-
thread basis. However,U and T operate in different trust
domains, thus they cannot share the same TLS buffer.
We let T continue to use gs for accessing its own TLS.
ConfLLVM changes the compilation ofU to access TLS in
a different way. The multiple (per-thread) stacks in U are
all allocated inside the stack regions; the public and private
stacks for each thread are still at a constant offset to each
other. Each thread stack is, by default, of maximum size 1MB
and its start is aligned to a 1MB boundary (configurable at
compile time). We keep the per-thread TLS buffer at the
beginning of the stack.U simply masks the lower 20-bits of
rsp to zeros to obtain the base of the stack and access TLS.
The segment-register scheme further requires switching
of the gs register as control transfers betweenU and T . We
use appropriate wrappers to achieve this switching, how-
ever T needs to reliably identify the current thread-id when
called fromU (so thatU cannot force two different threads
to use the same stack in T ). ConfLLVM achieves this by
instrumenting an inlined-version of the _chkstk routine1 to
make sure that rsp does not escape its stack boundaries.
4 Taint-aware CFI
We design a custom, taint-aware CFI scheme to ensure that
an attacker cannot alter the control flow ofU to circumvent
the instrumented checks and leak sensitive data.
Typical low-level attacks that can hijack the control flow
of a program include overwriting the return address, or the
targets of function pointers and indirect jumps. Existing
approaches use a combination of shadow stacks or stack ca-
naries to prevent overwriting the return address, or use fine-
grained taint tracking to ensure that the value of a function
pointer is not derived from user (i.e. attacker-controlled) in-
puts [26, 35, 57]. While these techniques may prevent certain
1https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms648426.aspx
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private int bar (private int *p, int *q)
{
int x = *p;
int y = *q;
return x + y;
}
(a) A sample U procedure
;argument registers p = r1, p = r2
;private memory operands are gs prefixed
;public memory operands are fs prefixed
sub rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp - 16
r3 = load gs:[e1] ;r3 = *p
store gs:[esp+4], r3 ;x = r3
r4 = load fs:[e2] ;r4 = *q
store fs:[esp+8], r4 ;y = r4
r5 = load gs:[esp+4] ;r5 = x
r6 = load fs:[esp+8] ;r6 = y
r7 = r5 + r6
add rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp + 16
ret r7
(b) Assembly code under segment scheme
;argument registers p = r1, q = r2
;stack offsets from rsp: x: 4, y: 8
sub rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp - 16
bndcu [r1], bnd1 ;MPX instructions to check that -
bndcl [r1], bnd1 ;-r1 points to private region
r3 = load [r1] ;r3 = *p
bndcu [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1 ;check that rsp+4+OFFSET -
bndcl [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1 ;-points to private region
store [rsp+4+ OFFSET], r3 ;x = r3
bndcu [r2], bnd0 ;check that r2 points to-
bndcl [r2], bnd0 ;-the public region
r4 = load [r2] ;r4 = *q
bndcu [rsp+8], bnd0 ;check that rsp+8 points to-
bndcl [rsp+8], bnd0 ;-the public region
store [rsp+8], r4 ;y = r4
bndcu [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1
bndcl [rsp+4+ OFFSET], bnd1
r5 = load [rsp+4+ OFFSET] ;r5 = x
bndcu [rsp+8], bnd0
bndcl [rsp+8], bnd0
r6 = load [rsp+8] ;r6 = y
r7 = r5 + r6
add rsp , 16 ;rsp = rsp + 16
ret r7
(c) Assembly code under MPX scheme
Figure 4. The (unoptimized) assembly generated by ConfLLVM for an example procedure.
attacks, our only goal is ensuring confidentiality. Thus, we
designed a custom taint-aware CFI scheme.
Our CFI scheme ensures that for each indirect transfer of
control: (a) the target address is some valid jump location, i.e.,
the target of an indirect call is some valid procedure entry,
and the target of a return is some valid return site, and (b)
the register taints expected at the target address match the
current register taints (e.g., when the rax register holds a
private value then a ret can only go to a site that expects
a private return value). These suffice for our goal of data
confidentiality. Our scheme does not need to ensure, for
instance, that a return matches the previous call.
CFI for function calls and returns. We use a magic-
sequence based scheme to achieve this CFI. We follow the
x64 calling convention for Windows that has 4 argument
registers and one return register. Our scheme picks two bit
sequences MCall and MRet of length 59 bits each that appear
nowhere else inU’s binary. Each procedure in the binary is
preceded with a string that consists of MCall followed by a
5-bit sequence encoding the expected taints of the 4 argu-
ment registers and the return register, as per the function
signature. Similarly, each valid return site in the binary is
preceded by MRet followed by a 1-bit encoding of the taint
of the return value register, again according to the callee’s
signature. To keep the length of the sequences uniform at 64
bits, the return site taint is padded with four zero bits. The
64-bit instrumented sequences are collectively referred to as
magic sequences.
Callee-save registers are also live at function entry and exit
and their taints cannot be determined statically by the com-
piler. ConfLLVM forces their taint to be public by making
the caller save and clear all the private-tainted callee-saved
registers before making a call. All dead registers (e.g. un-
used argument registers and caller-saved registers at the
beginning of a function) are conservatively marked private
to avoid accidental leaks. We note that our scheme can be
extended easily to support other calling conventions.
Consider the followingU:
private int add (private int x) { return x + 1; }
private int incr (private int *p, private int x) {
int y = add (x); *p = y; return *p; }
The compiled code for these functions is instrumented with
magic sequences as follows. The 5 taint bits for the add proce-
dure are 11111 as its argument x is private, unused argument
registers are conservatively treated as private, and its return
type is also private. On the other hand, the taint bits for incr
are 01111 because its first argument is a public pointer (note
that the private annotation on the argument is on the int, not
the pointer) , second argument is private, unused argument
registers are private, and the return value is also private. For
the return site in incr after the call to add, the taint bits are
00001 to indicate the private return value register (with 4 bits
of padding). The sample instrumentation is as shown below:
#M_call #11111#
add:
6
... ;assembly code for add
#M_call #01111#
incr:
... ;assembly code of incr
call add
#M_ret #00001# ;private -tainted ret with padded 0s
... ;assembly code for rest of incr
Our CFI scheme adds runtime checks using these sequences
as follows. Each ret is replaced with instructions to: (a) fetch
the return address, (b) confirm that the target location has
MRet followed by the taint-bit of the return register, and if
so, (c) jump to the target location. For our example, the ret
inside add is replaced as follows:
#M_call #11111#
add:
...
r1 = pop ;fetch return address
r2 = #M_ret_inverted #11110# ;bitwise negation
r2 = not r2 ;of M_ret
cmp [r1], r2
jne fail
r1 = add r1 , 8 ;skip magic sequence
jmp r1 ;return
fail: call __debugbreak
We use the bitwise negation of MRet in the code to maintain
the invariant that the magic sequence does not appear in the
binary at any place other than valid return sites. There is no
requirement that the negated sequence not appear elsewhere
in the binary.
For direct calls, ConfLLVM statically verifies that the
register taints match between the call site and the call target.
At indirect calls, the instrumentation is similar to that of a
ret: check that the target location contains MCall followed by
taint bits that match the register taints at the call site.
Indirect jumps. ConfLLVM does not generate indirect
(non-call) jumps inU. Indirect jumps are mostly required
for jump-table optimizations, which we currently disable.
We can conceptually support them as long as the jump tables
are statically known and placed in read-only memory.
The insertion of magic sequences increases code size but it
makes the CFI-checking more lightweight than the shadow
stack schemes. The unique sequences MCall and MRet are cre-
ated post linking when the binaries are available (Section 6).
5 Implementation
We implemented ConfLLVM as part of the LLVM frame-
work [36], targeting Windows and Linux x64 platforms. It is
possible to implement all of ConfLLVM’s instrumentation
using simple branching instructions available on all plat-
forms, but we rely on x64’s MPX support or x64’s segment
registers to optimize runtime performance. We leave the
optimizations on other architectures as future work.
5.1 ConfLLVM
Compiler front-end. We introduce a new type qualifier,
private, in the language that the programmers can use to
annotate sensitive data. For example, a private integer-typed
variable can be declared as private int x, and a (public)
pointer pointing to a private integer as private int *p. The
struct fields inherit their outermost annotation from the cor-
responding struct-typed variable. For example, consider a
declaration struct st { private int *p; }, and a variable x of
type struct st. Then x.p inherits its qualifier from x: if x is de-
clared as private st x;, then x.p is a private pointer pointing
to a private integer. We follow the same convention with
unions as well: all fields of a union inherit their outermost
annotation from the union-typed variable.
This convention ensures that despite the memory parti-
tioning into public and private regions, each object is laid out
contiguously in memory in only one of the regions. It does,
however, carry the limitation that one cannot have structures
or unions whose fields have mixed outermost annotations,
e.g., a struct with a public int field as well as a private int
field, or a union over two structures, one with a public int
field and another with a private int field. In all such cases,
the programmer must restructure their code, often by simply
introducing one level of indirection in the field (because the
type constraints only apply to the outermost level).
We modified the Clang [3] frontend to parse the private
type qualifier and generate the LLVM Intermediate Represen-
tation (IR) instrumented with this additional metadata. Once
the IR is generated, ConfLLVM runs standard LLVM IR op-
timizations that are part of the LLVM toolchain. Most of the
optimizations work as-is and don’t require any change. Op-
timizations that change the metadata (e.g. remove-dead-args
changes the function signatures), need to be modified. While
we found that it is not much effort to modify an optimization,
we chose to modify only the most important ones in order
to bound our effort. We disable the remaining optimizations
in our prototype.
LLVM IR and type inference. After all the optimizations
are run, our compiler runs a type qualifier inference [29] pass
over the IR. This inference pass propagates the type quali-
fier annotations to local variables, and outputs an IR where
all the intermediate variables are optionally annotated with
private qualifiers. The inference is implemented using a stan-
dard algorithm based on generating subtyping constraints on
dataflows, which are then solved using an SMT solver [27].
If the constraints are unsatisfiable, an error is reported to the
user. We refer the reader to [29] for details of the algorithm.
After type qualifier inference, ConfLLVM knows the taint
of eachmemory operand for load and store instructions.With
a simple dataflow analysis [17], the compiler statically deter-
mines the taint of each register at each instruction.
Register spilling and code generation.We made the reg-
ister allocator taint-aware: when a register is to be spilled on
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the stack, the compiler appropriately chooses the private or
the public stack depending on the taint of the register. Once
the LLVM IR is lowered to machine IR, ConfLLVM emits the
assembly code inserting all the checks for memory bounds
and taint-aware CFI.
MPX Optimizations. ConfLLVM optimizes the bounds-
checking in the MPX scheme. MPX instruction operands
are identical to x64 memory operands, therefore one can
check bounds of a complex operand using a single instruc-
tion. However, we found that bounds-checking a register is
faster than bounds-checking a memory operand (perhaps
because using a memory operand requires an implicit lea).
Consequently, ConfLLVM uses instructions on a register (as
opposed to a complex memory operand) as much as possible
for bounds checking. It reserves 1MB of space around the
public and private regions as guard regions and eliminates
the displacement from the memory operand of a check if its
absolute value is smaller than 220. Usually the displacement
value is a small constant (for accessing structure fields or
doing stack accesses) and this optimization applies to a large
degree. Further, by enabling the _chkstk enforcement for the
MPX scheme also (Section 3), ConfLLVM eliminates checks
on stack accesses altogether because the rsp value is bound
to be within the public region (and rsp+OFFSET is bound to be
within the private region).
ConfLLVM further coalesces MPX checks within a basic
block. Before adding a check, it confirms if the same check
was already added previously in the same block, and there are
no intervening call instructions or subsequent modifications
to the base or index registers.
Implicit flows. By default, ConfLLVM tracks explicit flows.
It additionally produces a warning when the program
branches on private data, indicating the presence of a pos-
sible implicit flow. Such a branch is easy to detect: it is a
conditional jump on a private-tainted register. Thus, if no
such warning is produced, then the application indeed lacks
both explicit and implicit flows. Additionally, we also allow
the compiler to be used in an all-private scenario where all
data manipulated by U is tainted private. In such a case,
the job of the compiler is easy: it only needs to limit mem-
ory accesses in U to its own region of memory. Implicit
flows are not possible in this mode. None of our applications
(Section 7) have implicit flows.
5.2 ConfVerify
ConfVerify checks that a binary produced by ConfLLVM
has the required instrumentation in place to guarantee that
there are no (explicit) private data leaks. The design goal of
ConfVerify is to guard against bugs in ConfLLVM; it is not
meant for general-purpose verification of arbitrary binaries.
ConfVerify actually helped us catch bugs in ConfLLVM
during its development.
ConfVerify is only 1500 LOC in addition to an off-the-
shelf disassembler that it uses for CFG construction. (Our
current implementation uses the LLVM disassembler.) This
is three orders of magnitude smaller than ConfLLVM’s
5MLOC. Moreover, ConfVerify is much simpler than Con-
fLLVM; ConfVerify does not include register allocation,
optimizations, etc. and uses a simple dataflow analysis to
check all the flows. Consequently, it provides a higher degree
of assurance for the security of our scheme.
Disassembly. ConfVerify requires the unique prefixes of
magic sequences (Section 4) as input and uses them to iden-
tify procedure entries in the binary. It starts disassembling
the procedures and constructs their control-flow graphs
(CFG). ConfVerify assumes that the binary satisfies CFI,
which makes it possible to reliably identify all instructions
in a procedure. If the disassembly fails, the binary is rejected.
Otherwise, ConfVerify checks its assumptions: that the
magic sequences were indeed unique in the procedures iden-
tified and that they have enough CFI checks.
Data flow analysis and checks. Next, ConfVerify per-
forms a separate dataflow analysis on every procedure’s
CFG to determine the taints of all the registers at each in-
struction. It starts from the taint bits of the magic sequence
preceding the procedure. It looks for MPX checks or the
use of segment registers to identify the taints of memory
operands; if it cannot find a check in the same basic block,
the verification fails. For each store instruction, it checks that
the taint of the destination operand matches the taint of the
source register. For direct calls, it checks that the expected
taints of the arguments, as encoded in the magic sequence
at the callee, matches the taints of the argument registers at
the callsite (this differs from ConfLLVM which uses func-
tions signatures). For indirect control transfers (indirect calls
and ret), ConfVerify confirms that there is a check for the
magic sequence at the target site and that its taint bits match
the inferred taints for registers. After a call instruction, Con-
fVerify picks up taint of the return register from the magic
sequence (there should be one), marks all caller-save regis-
ters as private, and callee-save registers as public (following
ConfLLVM’s convention).
Additional checks. ConfVerify additionally makes sure
that a direct or a conditional jump can only go a location
in the same procedure. ConfVerify rejects a binary that
has an indirect jump, a system call, or if it modifies a seg-
ment register. ConfVerify also confirms correct usage of
_chkstk to ensure that rsp is kept within stack bounds. For the
segment-register scheme, ConfVerify additionally checks
that each memory operand uses only the lower 32-bits of
registers.
Formal analysis. Although ConfVerify is fairly simple,
to improve our confidence in its design, we built a formal
model consisting of an abstract assembly language with es-
sential features like indirect calls, returns, as well as Con-
fVerify’s checks. We prove formally that any program that
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passes ConfVerify’s checks satisfies the standard informa-
tion flow security property of termination-insensitive nonin-
terference [50]. In words, this property states that data leaks
are impossible. We defer the details of the formalization to
Appendix A.
6 Toolchain
This section describes the overall flow to launch an applica-
tion using our toolchain.
CompilingU using ConfLLVM. The only external func-
tions for U’s code are those exported by T . U’s code is
compiled with an (auto-generated) stub file, that imple-
ments each of these T functions as an indirect jump from
a table externals, located at a constant position in U (e.g.,
jmp (externals + offset)i for the i-th function). The table
externals is initialized with zeroes at this point, and Con-
fLLVM links all theU files to produce aU dll.
TheU dll is then post-processed to patch all the references
to globals, so that they correspond to the correct (private or
public) region. The globals themselves are relocated by the
loader. The post-processing pass also sets the 59-bit prefix
for the magic sequences (used for CFI, Section 4). We find
these sequences by generating random bit sequences and
checking for uniqueness; usually a small number of iterations
are sufficient.
Wrappers for T functions. For each of the functions in
T ’s interface exported toU, we write a small wrapper that:
(a) performs the necessary checks for the arguments (e.g.
the send wrapper would check that its argument buffer is
contained inU’s public region), (b) copies arguments to T ’s
stack, (c) switches gs, (d) switches rsp to T ’s stack, and (e)
calls the underlying T function (e.g. send in libc). On return,
it the wrapper switches gs and rsp back and jumps toU in
a similar manner to our CFI return instrumentation. Addi-
tionally, the wrappers include the magic sequences similar
to those inU so that the CFI checks inU do not fail when
calling T . These wrappers are compiled with the T dll, and
the output dll exports the interface functions.
Loading the U and T dlls. When loading the U and T
dlls, the loader: (1) populates the externals table in U with
addresses of the wrapper functions in T , (2) relocates the
globals in U to their respective, private or public regions,
(3) sets the MPX bound registers for the MPX scheme or
the segment registers for the segment-register scheme, and
(4) initializes the heaps and stacks in all the regions, marks
them non-executable, and jumps to the main routine.
Memory allocator. ConfLLVM uses a customized memory
allocator to enclose the private and public allocations in their
respective sections. We modified dlmalloc [5] to achieve this.
7 Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is three-fold: (a) Quantify the
performance overheads of ConfLLVM’s instrumentation,
both for enforcing bounds and for enforcing CFI; (b) Demon-
strate that ConfLLVM scales to large, existing applications
and quantify changes to existing applications to make them
ConfLLVM-compatible; (c) Check that our scheme actually
stops confidentiality exploits in applications.
7.1 CPU benchmarks
We measured the overheads of ConfLLVM’s instrumenta-
tion on the standard SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks [12]. We
treat the code of the benchmarks as untrusted (in U) and
compile it with ConfLLVM. We use the system’s native libc,
which is treated as trusted (in T ). These benchmarks use
no private data, so we added no annotations to the bench-
marks, which makes all data public by default. Nonetheless,
the code emitted by ConfLLVM ensures that all memory
accesses are actually in the public region, it enforces CFI,
and switches stacks when calling T functions, so this exper-
iment accurately captures ConfLLVM’s overheads. We ran
the benchmarks in the following configurations.
- Base: Benchmarks compiled with vanilla LLVM, with
O2 optimizations. This is the baseline for evaluation.2
- BaseOA: Benchmarks compiled with vanilla LLVM but
running with our custom allocator.
- OurBare: Compiled with ConfLLVM, but without any
runtime instrumentation. However, all optimizations
unsupported by ConfLLVM are disabled, the memo-
ries of T andU are separated and, hence, stacks are
switched in calling T functions fromU.
- OurCFI: Like OurBare but additionally with CFI instru-
mentation, but no memory bounds enforcement.
- OurMPX: Full ConfLLVM, memory-bounds checks use
MPX.
- OurSeg: Full ConfLLVM, memory-bounds checks use
segmentation.
Briefly, the difference between OurCFI and OurBare is the
cost of our CFI instrumentation. The difference between
OurMPX (resp. OurSeg) and OurCFI is the cost of enforcing
bounds using MPX (resp. segment registers).
We ran all of the C benchmarks of SPEC CPU 2006, ex-
cept perlBench, which uses fork that we currently do not
support. All benchmarks were run on a Microsoft Surface
Pro-4 Windows 10 machine with an Intel Core i7-6650U 2.20
GHz 64-bit processor with 2 cores (4 logical cores) and 8 GB
RAM.
Figure 5 shows the results of our experiment. The over-
head of ConfLLVM using MPX (OurMPX) is up to 74.03%,
while that of ConfLLVM using segmentation (OurSeg) is up
to 24.5%. As expected, the overheads are almost consistently
significantly lower when using segmentation than when
using MPX. Looking further, some of the overhead (up to
10.2%) comes from CFI enforcement (OurCFI−OurBare). The
2O2 is the standard optimization level for performance evaluation. Higher
levels include “optimizations” that don’t always speed up the program.
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Figure 5. Execution time as a percentage of Base for SPEC CPU
2006 benchmarks. Numbers above the Base bars are absolute exe-
cution times of the baseline in ms. All bars are averages of 10 runs.
Standard deviations are all below 3%.
average CFI overhead is 3.62%, competitive with best known
techniques [26]. Stack switching and disabled optimizations
(OurBare) account for the remaining overhead. The overhead
due to our custom memory allocator (BaseOA) is negligible
and, in many benchmarks, the custom allocator improves
performance.
We further comment on some seemingly odd results. On
mcf, the cost of CFI alone (OurCFI, 4.17%) seems to be higher
than that of the full MPX-based instrumentation (OurMPX,
4.02%). We verified that this is due to an outlier in theOurCFI
experiment. On hmmer, the overhead of OurBare is negative
because the optimizations that ConfLLVM disables actually
slow it down. Finally, on milc, the overhead of ConfLLVM is
negative because this benchmark benefits significantly from
the use of our custom memory allocator. Indeed, relative to
BaseOA, the remaining overheads follow expected trends.
7.2 Web server: NGINX
Next, we demonstrate that our method and ConfLLVM scale
to large applications. We cover three applications in this and
the next two sections.We first useConfLLVM to protect logs
in NGINX, the most popular web server among high-traffic
websites [10]. NGINX has a logging module that logs time
stamps, processing times, etc. for each request along with
request metadata such as the client address and the request
URI. An obvious confidentiality concern is that sensitive
content from files being served may leak into the logs due
to bugs. We use ConfLLVM to prevent such leaks.
We annotate NGINX’s codebase to place OpenSSL in T ,
and the rest of NGINX, including all its request parsing,
processing, serving, and logging code inU. The code inU
is compiled with ConfLLVM (total 124,001 LoC). WithinU,
we mark everything as private, except for the buffers in the
logging module that are marked as public. To log request
URIs, which are actually private, we add a new encrypt_log
function to T that U invokes to encrypt the request URI
before adding it to the log. This function encrypts using a
key that is isolated in T ’s own region. The key is pre-shared
with the administrator who is authorized to read the logs.
The encrypted result of encrypt_log is placed in a public buffer.
The standard SSL_recv function in T decrypts the incoming
payloadwith the session key, and provides it toU in a private
buffer.
size_t SSL_recv(SSL *connection ,
private void *buffer , size_t length );
In total, we added or modified 160 LoC in NGINX (0.13% of
NGINX’s codebase) and added 138 LoC to T .
Our goal is to measure the overhead of ConfLLVM on
the maximum sustained throughput of NGINX. We run our
experiments in 6 configurations: Base, Our1Mem, OurBare,
OurCFI, and OurMPX-Sep, OurMPX. Of these, Base, OurBare,
OurCFI, and OurMPX are the same as those in Section 7.1.
We use MPX for bounds checks (OurMPX), as opposed to
segmentation, since we know from Section 7.1 that MPX
is worse for ConfLLVM. Our1Mem is like OurBare (compiled
withConfLLVMwithout any instrumentation), but also does
not separate memories for T and U. OurMPX-Sep includes
all instrumentation, but does not separate stacks for private
and public data. Briefly, the difference between OurBare and
Our1Mem is the overhead of separatingT ’s memory fromU’s
and switching stacks on every call to T , while the difference
betweenOurMPX andOurMPX-Sep is the overhead of increased
cache pressure from having separate stacks for private and
public data.
We host NGINX version 1.13.12 on an Intel Core i7-6700
3.40GHz 64-bit processor with 4 cores (8 logical cores), 32 GB
RAM, and a 10 Gbps Ethernet card, running Ubuntu v16.04.1
with Linux kernel version 4.13.0-38-generic. Hyperthreading
was disabled in order to reduce experimental noise. NGINX
is configured to run a single worker process pinned to a core.
We connect to the server from two client machines using the
wrk2 tool [15], simulating a total of 32 concurrent clients.
Each client makes 10,000 sequential requests, randomly cho-
sen from a corpus of 1,000 files of the same size (we vary
the file size across experiments). The files are served from a
RAM disk. This saturates the CPU core hosting NGINX in
all setups.
Figure 6 shows the steady-state throughputs in the six
configurations for file sizes ranging from 0 to 40 KB. For
file sizes beyond 40 KB, the 10 Gbps network card saturates
in the base line before the CPU, and the excess CPU cycles
absorb our overheads.
Overall, ConfLLVM’s overhead on sustained throughput
ranges from 3.25% to 29.32%. The overhead is not mono-
tonic in file size or base line throughput, indicating that
there are compensating effects at play. For large file sizes,
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Figure 6.Maximum sustained throughput as a percentage of Base
for the NGINX web server with increasing response sizes. Numbers
above the Base bars are absolute throughputs in req/s for the
baseline. All bars are averages of 10 runs. Standard deviations are
all below 0.3%, except in Base for response sizes 0 KB and 1 KB,
where they are below 2.2%.
the relative amount of time spent outsideU, e.g., in the ker-
nel in copying data, is substantial. Since code outsideU is
not subject to our instrumentation, our relative overhead
falls for large file sizes (>10 KB here) and eventually tends
to zero. The initial increase in overhead up to file size 10
KB comes mostly from the increased cache pressure due to
the separation of stacks for public and private data (the dif-
ference OurMPX−OurMPX-Sep). This is unsurprising: As the
file size increases, so does the cache footprint ofU. In con-
trast, the overheads due to CFI (difference OurCFI−OurBare)
and the separation of the memories of T andU (difference
OurBare−Our1Mem) are relatively constant for small file sizes.
Note that these overheads are moderate and we expect
that they can be reduced further by using segmentation in
place of MPX for bounds checks.
7.3 OpenLDAP
Next, we apply ConfLLVM to OpenLDAP [45], an imple-
mentation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) [53]. LDAP is a standard for organizing and access-
ing hierarchical information. Here, we use ConfLLVM to
protect root and user passwords stored in OpenLDAP ver-
sion 2.4.45. By default, the root password (which authorizes
access to OpenLDAP’s entire store) and user passwords are
all stored unencrypted. We added new functions to encrypt
and decrypt these passwords, and modified OpenLDAP to
use these functions prior to storing and loading passwords,
respectively. The concern still is that OpenLDAP might leak
in-memory passwords without encrypting them. To prevent
this, we treat all of OpenLDAP as untrusted (U), and protect
it by compiling it with ConfLLVM. The new cryptographic
functions are in T . Specifically, decryption returns its output
in a private buffer, so ConfLLVM preventsU from leaking
it. The part we compile with ConfLLVM is 300,000 lines
of C code, spread across 728 source files. Our modifications
amount to 52 new LoC for T and 100 edited LoC inU. To-
gether, these constitute about 0.5% of the original codebase.
We configure OpenLDAP as a multi-threaded server (the
default) with a memory-mapped backing store (also the de-
fault), and simple username/password authentication. We
use the same machine as for the SPEC CPU benchmarks
(Section 7.1) to host an OpenLDAP server configured to
run 6 concurrent threads. The server is pre-populated with
10,000 random directory entries. All memory-mapped files
are cached in memory before the experiment starts.
In our first experiment, 80 concurrent clients connected
to the server from another machine over a 100Mbps direct
Ethernet link issue concurrent requests for directory entries
that do not exist. Across three trials, the server handles on av-
erage 26,254 and 22,908 requests per second in the baseline
(Base) and ConfLLVM using MPX (OurMPX). This corre-
sponds to a throughput degradation of 12.74%. The server
CPU remains nearly saturated throughout the experiment.
The standard deviations are very small (1.7% and 0.2% in
Base and OurMPX, respectively).
Our second experiment is identical to the first, except that
60 concurrent clients issue small requests for entries that
exist on the server. Now, the baseline and ConfLLVM handle
29,698 and 26,895 queries per second, respectively. This is a
throughput degradation of 9.44%. The standard deviations
are small (less than 0.2%).
The reason for the difference in overheads in these two
experiments is that OpenLDAP does less work in U look-
ing for directory entries that exist than it does looking for
directory entries that don’t exist. Again, the overheads of
ConfLLVM’s instrumentation are only moderate and can be
reduced further by using segmentation in place of MPX.
7.4 ConfLLVM with Intel SGX
Hardware features, such as the Intel Software Guard Exten-
sions (SGX) [25], allow isolating sensitive code and data into
a separate enclave, which cannot be read or written directly
from outside. Although this affords strong protection (even
against a malicious operating system), bugs within the iso-
lated code can still leak sensitive data out from the enclave.
This risk can be mitigated by using ConfLLVM to compile
the code that runs within the enclave.
We experimented with Privado [60], a system that per-
forms image classification by running a pre-trained model on
a user-provided image. Privado treats both the model (i.e.,
its parameters) and the user input as sensitive information.
These appear unencrypted only inside an enclave. Privado
contains a port of Torch [13, 14] made compatible with In-
tel SGX SDK. The image classifier is an eleven-layer neural
network (NN) that categorizes images into ten classes.
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We treat both Torch and the NN as untrusted codeU and
compile them using ConfLLVM. We mark all data in the
enclave private, and map U’s private region to a block of
memory within the enclave. U contains roughly 36K Loc.
The trusted code (T ) running inside the enclave only con-
sists of generic application-independent logic: the enclave
SDK, our memory allocator, stubs to switch between T and
U, and a declassifier that communicates the result of im-
age classification (which is a private value) back to the host
running outside the enclave. Outside the enclave, we deploy
a web server that takes encrypted images from clients and
classifies them inside the enclave. The use of ConfLLVM
crucially reduces trust on the application-sensitive logic that
is all contained inU: ConfLLVM enforces that the declas-
sifier is the only way to communicate private information
outside the enclave.
We ran this setup on an Intel Core i7-6700 3.40GHz 64-bit
processor with an Ubuntu 16.04 OS (Linux 4.15.0-34-generic
kernel). We connect to our application from a client that
issues 10,000 sequential requests to classify small (3 KB) files,
and measure the response time per image within the enclave
(thus excluding latencies outside the enclave, which are com-
mon to the baseline and our enforcement). We do this in 5
configurations of Section 7.1: Base, BaseOA,OurBare,OurCFI
and OurMPX. Figure 7 shows the average response time for
classifying an image in each of these five configurations. For
Base, we use the optimization level O2, while the remain-
ing configurations use O2 except for two source files (out
of 13) where a bug in ConfLLVM (an optimization pass of
O2 crashes) forces us to use O0. This means that the over-
heads reported in Figure 7 are higher than actual and, hence,
conservative.
The overhead of OurMPX is 26.87%. This is much lower
than many of the latency experiments of Section 7.1. This is
because, in the classifier, a significant amount of time (almost
70%) is spent in a tight loop, which contains mostly only
floating point instructions and our instrumentation’s MPX
bound-check instructions. These two classes of instructions
can execute in parallel on the CPU, so the overhead of our
instrumentation is masked within the loop.
7.5 Data integrity and scaling with parallelism
The goal of our next experiment is two-fold: to verify that
ConfLLVM’s instrumentation scales well with thread par-
allelism, and to test that ConfLLVM can be used to protect
data integrity, not just confidentiality.We implemented a sim-
ple multi-threaded userspace library that offers standard file
read and write functionality, but additionally provides data
integrity by maintaining a Merkle hash tree of file system
contents. A security concern is that a bug in the application
or the library may clobber the hash tree to nullify integrity
guarantees. To prevent this, we compile both the library
and its clients using ConfLLVM (i.e. as part ofU). All data
within the client and the library is marked private. The only
Figure 7. Average classification time for Privado inside an Intel
SGX Enclave as a percentage of Base. The number above the Base
bar is the absolute execution time of the baseline in ms. Every bar
is the average of 10,000 trials. Standard deviations are all below 1%.
exception is the hash tree, which is marked public. As usual,
ConfLLVM prevents the private data from being written to
public data structures accidentally, thus providing integrity
for the hash tree. To write hashes to the tree intentionally,
we place the hashing function in T , allowing it to “declassify”
data hashes as public.
We experiment with this library on a Windows 10 ma-
chine with an Intel i7-6700 CPU (4 cores, 8 hyperthreaded
cores) and 32 GB RAM. Our client program creates between
1 and 6 parallel threads, all of which read a 2 GB file concur-
rently. The file is memory-mapped within the library and
cached previously. This gives us a CPU-bound workload. We
measure the total time taken to perform the reads in three
configurations: Base, OurSeg and OurMPX. Figure 8 shows
the total runtime as a function of the number of threads
and the configuration. Until the number of threads exceeds
the number of cores (4), the absolute execution time (writ-
ten above the Base bars) and relative overhead of both the
MPX and segmentation schemes remains nearly constant,
establishing linear scaling with the number of threads. The
actual overhead of OurSeg is below 10% and that of OurMPX
is below 17% in all configurations.
7.6 Vulnerability-injection experiments
To test that ConfLLVM stops data extraction vulnerabilities
from being exploited, we hand-crafted three vulnerabilities.
In all cases, compiling the vulnerable applications with Con-
fLLVM (after adding suitable private annotations) prevented
the vulnerabilities from being exploited.
First, we introduced a buffer-bounds vulnerability in the
popular Mongoose web server [9] in the code path for serv-
ing an unencrypted file over http. The vulnerability transmits
any amount of stale data from the stack, unencrypted. We
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Figure 8. Total execution time as a percentage of Base for reading
a memory-mapped 2 GB file in parallel, as a function of the number
of reading threads. Numbers above the Base bars are absolute
execution times of the baseline in ms. Each bar is an average of 5
runs. Standard deviations are all below 3%.
wrote a client that exploits the vulnerability by first request-
ing a private file, which causes some contents of the private
file to be written to the stack in clear text, and then request-
ing a public file with the exploit. This leaks stale private
data from the first request. Using ConfLLVM on Mongoose
with proper annotations stops the exploit since ConfLLVM
separates the private and public stacks. The contents of the
private file are written to the private stack but the exploit
reads from the public stack.
Second, wemodifiedMinizip [8], a file compression tool, to
explicitly leak the file encryption password to a log file. Con-
fLLVM’s type inference detects this leak once we annotate
the password as private. To make it harder for ConfLLVM,
we added several pointer type casts on the password, which
make it impossible to detect the leak statically. But, then, the
dynamic checks inserted by ConfLLVM prevent the leak.
Third, we wrote a simple function with a format string
vulnerability in its use of printf. printf is a vararg function,
whose first argument, the format string, determines how
many subsequent arguments the function tries to print. If
the format string has more directives than the number of ar-
guments, potentially due to adversary provided input, printf
ends up reading other data from either the argument regis-
ters or the stack. If any of this data is private, it results in a
data leak. ConfLLVM prevents this vulnerability from being
exploited if we include printf’s code inU: since printf tries
to read all arguments into buffers marked public, the bounds
enforcement of ConfLLVM prevents it from reading any
private data.
8 Discussion and Future Work
Currently, our scheme allows classifying data into two-
levels—public and private. It cannot be used for finer classifi-
cation, e.g., to separate the private data of Alice, the private
data of Bob and public data at the same time. We also do not
support label polymorphism at present, although that can
potentially be implemented using C++-like templates.
In our scheme, T is trusted and therefore must be imple-
mented with care. ConfLLVM guarantees that U cannot
access T ’s memory or jump to arbitrary points in T , so
the only remaining attack surface for T is the API that it
exposes to U. T must ensure that stringing together a se-
quence of these API calls cannot cause leaks. We recommend
the following (standard) strategies. First, T should be kept
small, mostly containing application-independent function-
ality, e.g., communication interfaces, cryptographic routines,
and optionally a small number of libc routines (mainly for
performance reasons), moving the rest of the code toU. Such
a T can be re-used across applications and can be subject to
careful audit/verification. Further, declassification routines
in T must provide guarded access to U. For instance, T
should disallow an arbitrary number of calls to a password
checking routine to prevent probing attacks.
We rely on the absence of the magic sequence in T ’s
binary to preventU from jumping inside T . We ensure this
by selecting the magic string when the entire code ofU and
T is available. While dynamic loading inU can simply be
disallowed, any dynamic loading in T must ensure that the
loaded library does not contain the magic sequence. Since
the (59-bits) magic sequence is generated at random, the
chances of it appearing in the loaded library is minimal. A
stronger defense is to instrument indirect control transfers
inU to remain insideU’s own code.
ConfLLVM supports callbacks from T toU with the help
of trusted wrappers inU that return to a fixed location in
T , where T can restore its stack and start execution from
where it left off (or fail if T never called intoU).
At present, ConfLLVM only supports the C language.
Implementing support for C++ remains as interesting future
work. It requires integrating the private type qualifier with
the C++ type system and ensuring that the C++ runtime and
object system respects the user-intended taint flow.
9 Related Work
Our work bears similarities to Sinha et al. [57] who proposed
a design methodology for programming secure enclaves (e.g.,
those that use Intel SGX instructions for memory isolation).
The code inside an enclave is divided into U and L. U’s
code is compiled via a special instrumenting compiler [23]
while L’s code is trusted and may be compiled using any
compiler. This is similar in principle to our U-T division.
However, there are several differences. First, even the goals
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are different: their scheme does not track taints; it only en-
sures that all unencrypted I/O done byU goes through L,
which encrypts all outgoing data uniformly. Thus, the appli-
cation cannot carry out plain-text communication even on
public data without losing the security guarantee. Second,
their implementation does not support multi-threading (it
relies on page protection to isolate L fromU). Third, they
maintain a bitmap of writeable memory locations for enforc-
ing CFI, resulting in time and memory overheads. Our CFI
is taint-aware and without these overheads. Finally, their
verifier does not scale to SPEC benchmarks, whereas our
verifier is faster and scales to all binaries that we have tried.
In an effort parallel to ours, Carr et al. [22] present
DataShield, whose goal, like ConfLLVM’s, is information
flow control in low-level code. However, there are several
differences between DataShield and our work. First and fore-
most, DataShield itself only prevents non-control data flow
attacks in which data is leaked or corrupted without relying
on a control flow hijack. A separate CFI solution is needed
to prevent leaks of information in the face of control flow
hijacks. In contrast, our scheme incorporates a customized
CFI that provides only the minimum necessary for infor-
mation flow control. One of the key insights of our work
is that (standard) CFI is neither necessary nor sufficient to
prevent information flow violations due to control flow hi-
jacks. Second, DataShield places blind trust in its compiler.
In contrast, in our work, the verifier ConfVerify eliminates
the need to trust the compiler ConfLLVM. Third, DataShield
enforces memory safety at object-granularity on sensitive
objects. This allows DataShield to enforce integrity for data
invariants, which is mostly outside the scope of our work.
However, as we show in Section 7.5, our work can be used to
prevent untrusted data from flowing into sensitive locations,
which is a different form of integrity.
Rocha et al. [48] and Banerjee et al. [18] use combination
of hybrid and static methods for information flow control,
but in memory- and type-safe languages like Java. Cimplifier
by Rastogi et al. [47] tracks information flow only at the level
of process binaries by using separate docker containers.
Region-based memory partitioning has been explored be-
fore in the context of safe and efficient memory manage-
ment [30, 59], but not for information flow. InConfLLVM, re-
gions obviate the need for dynamic taint tracking [39, 51, 55].
TaintCheck [44] first proposed the idea of dynamic taint
tracking, and forms the basis of Valgrind [43]. DECAF [33] is
a whole system binary analysis framework including a taint-
tracking mechanism. However, such dynamic taint trackers
incur heavy performance overhead. For example, DECAF
has an overhead of 600%. Similarly, TaintCheck can impose a
37x performance overhead for CPU-bound applications. Suh
et al. [58] report less than 1% overheads for their dynamic
taint-tracking scheme, but they rely on custom hardware.
Static analyses [20, 21, 31, 52] of source code can prove
security-relevant criteria such as safe downcasts in C++, or
the correct use of variadic arguments.When proofs cannot be
constructed, runtime checks are inserted to enforce relevant
policy at runtime. This is similar to our use of runtime checks,
but the purposes are different.
Memory-safety techniques for C such as CCured [42] and
SoftBound [41] do not provide confidentiality in all cases and
already have overheads higher than those of ConfLLVM
(see [22, Section 2.2] for a summary of the overheads). Tech-
niques such as control flow integrity (CFI) [16] and code-
pointer integrity (CPI) [35] prevent control flow hijacks but
not all data leaks. While our new taint-aware CFI is an inte-
gral component of our enforcement, our goal of preventing
data leaks goes beyond CFI and CPI. Our CFI mechanism is
similar to Abadi et al. [16] and Zeng et al. [61] in its use of
magic sequences, but our magic sequences are taint-aware.
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Cmd := ldr
(
reg , exp
) | str (reg , exp) | goto (exp) |
ifthenelse (exp, goto (exp) , goto (exp)) | ret |
call{U |T } f
(
exp∗
) | icall exp (exp∗) | assert (exp∗)
exp := n ∈ Val | reg ∈ Reд | ♢u exp | exp ♢b exp | &f
Table 1. Command syntax
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A Formal model of verifier
Conceptually, ConfVerify operates in two stages. First, it
disassembles a binary, constructs its control flow graph (CFG)
and re-infers the taints of registers at all program points. Sec-
ond, it checks that the taints at the beginning and end of
every instruction are consistent with the instruction’s seman-
tics, and that other dynamic checks described in Section 5.2
are correctly inserted. Here, we formalize the second stage
and show if a program passes those checks, then the program
is secure in a formal sense. We assume that the disassembly
and the reconstruction of the CFG from the first stage, both
of which use an existing tool, are correct.
We model the disassembled CFG abstractly. For each
function, the CFG has one bit of metadata, which indicates
whether the function is part of the trusted code or the un-
trusted code (abstractly written T andU, respectively). Ad-
ditionally, there is a 64-bit magic sequence for each func-
tion, which encodes the taints of the function’s arguments
and its return value (see Section 4). For trusted functions
(whose code ConfVerify does not analyze), this is all the
CFG contains. For untrusted functions (whose code Con-
fVerify does analyze), there is an additional block-graph
describing the code of the function. The block-graph for an
untrusted function f is a tuple Gf = ⟨Vf , E⟩ of nodes of f
and edges E ⊆ V × V . The edges represent all direct control
transfers. A node ⟨pc,C, Γ , Γ ′⟩ ∈ Vf consists of a program
counter pc , a single command (assembly instruction) C , and
register taints Γ and Γ ′ before and after the execution of C .
pc is a number, like a line number, that can be used in an
indirect jump to this node. Γ and Γ ′ are maps from machine
register ids to {H, L}, representing high (private) and low
(public) data.
CommandsC are represented in an abstract syntax shown
in Table 1. The auxiliary syntax of expressions consists of con-
stants, which here can only be integers that may represent
ordinary data or line numbers, standard binary and unary
operators (ranged over by ♢b and ♢u , respectively), and
the special operation &f which returns the pc of the starting
instruction of function f . We assume that operations used
in expressions are total, i.e., expressions never get stuck.
Commands include register load ldr
(
reg , exp
)
and store
str
(
reg , exp
)
where the input exp evaluates to a mem-
ory location, unconditional jumps goto (exp), conditionals
ifthenelse, direct function calls call{U |T } f (exp∗), indirect
function calls icall, and return ret. The subscript for call{U |T }
denotes if the command is used to invoke an untrusted func-
tionality or a trusted one. An additional command assert
models checks inserted by the compiler. The asserted ex-
pressions must be true, else the program halts in a special
state ⊥. Figure 10 presents the operational semantic of the
commands in Table 1.
Every CFG G has a designated entry function, similar to
main() in C programs.
Dynamic semantics. A program/CFG G can be evaluated
in a context of a data memory µ :Val→Val , a register state
ρ :Reд→Val and a program counter pc which points to a
node in the program’s CFG. Thememory µ is actually a union
of two maps µL and µH over disjoint domains, representing
the low and the high regions ofmemory of our scheme. Given
a fixedG , a configuration s ofG is a record ⟨µ, ρ, [σH : σL],pc⟩
of the entire state—the memory, register state, stack, and the
program counter. We make a distinction between high (σH)
and low (σL) stacks. We write ⟨.⟩.i to project a tuple to its ith
component. Thus, if s = ⟨µ, ρ, [σH : σL],pc⟩, then s .pc = pc .
We call a configuration s initial (final) if s .pc is the first (last)
node of the entry function of G.
Next, we define the dynamic semantics of a program as a
transition relation s → s ′ (Figure 9). We use e ⇓ n to mean
evaluation of an expression to its corresponding (concrete)
value. Moreover, we extend the configuration s of G with an
additional component ν that represents the memory frag-
ment available only to the trusted code and its protected
against untrusted accesses, i.e., ⟨ν , µ , ρ , [σH : σL],pc⟩. Fur-
ther, we introduce the record F = { fi 7→ ⟨ni ,M_calli ⟩ | fi ∈
P} and extend the typing judgment with this record F ,G ⊢
Γ {pc}Γ ′. F keeps for each function its starting node in the
CFG and the magic sequence associated with that function.
We only note that calls to trusted functions, whose code is
not modeled in the CFG, are represented via an external rela-
tion s ↪→f s ′ that models the entire execution of the trusted
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function f and its effects on the configuration. The special
transition s → ⊥ means that s .pc contains an assert com-
mand, one of whose arguments evaluates to false.⊥ does not
transition any further. Furthermore, the transition s →  is
used to model adversarial behavior, for example, when the
target of icall is not in the CFG.  resembles a configuration
where memory locations are loaded with random values.
Security Analysis.We formalize the checks that ConfVer-
ify makes via the judgment G ⊢ Γ {pc}Γ ′, which means that
the command in the node labeled pc in the CFG G is consis-
tent with the beginning and ending taints Γ and Γ ′, and that
the checks from Section 5.2 corresponding to this command
are satisfied. Rules for this judgment are shown in Figure 10.
The function pred(G,pc) returns the predecessors of the node
labeled pc in G. For ℓ ∈ {L,H}, assert(e ∈ Dom(µℓ)) repre-
sents the dynamic check that e evaluates to an address in the
domain of µℓ , and the auxiliary judgment Γ ⊢ e : ℓ means
that the expression e depends only on values with secrecy ℓ
or lower.
The rules are mostly self-explanatory. The first rule, which
is for the command ldr(reg, e), says that if reg has taint ℓe af-
ter the command, then on all paths leading to this command,
there must be a check that whatever e evaluates to is actually
pointing into µℓe . The rule for str is similar. In the rules for
indirect branching, we insist that the addresses of the branch
targets have the taint L. Overall, our type system’s design is
inspired by the flow-sensitive information flow type system
of Hunt and Sands [34]. However, the runtime checks are
new to our system.
We formally define call- and return-sites magic se-
quences based on the CFG structure. Let Cons be the bit-
concatenation function, then: (i) for the function entry node
v, M_call = Cons
i=0...3
(v.Γ (regi )), and (ii) for a given return
address adr and the node v such that v ∈ pred(G,adr ),
M_ret = v.Γ ′(reg0). We now turn to explain the meaning of
rules in Figure 10.
call For the call statement we check that the expected
taints of the arguments, as encoded in the magic sequence
at the callee, matches the taints of the argument registers
at the callsite. It is also worth noting that at runtime all
return addresses are stored in the stack allocated for the
low-security context.
icall For the indirect calls ConfVerify confirms that the
function pointer is low and that there is a check for the
magic sequence at the target site and its taint bits match
the inferred taints for registers. Note that since the check
assert(ℓ[1−4] ⊑ M_call and ef ∈ G and (ef 7→M_call) ∈ F )
is a runtime condition, the pointer ef will be evaluated to the
corresponding function name at the execution time and we
can retrieve the magic string directly from F . The condition
ef ∈ G ensures that the target of the call statement is a valid
node in the CFG of the program.
ret Similar to indirect function call, for the ret command
we check that there is a check for the magic sequence at the
target site and that its taint bits match the inferred taints
for registers. Additionally, ConfVerify confirms that the
return address on the stack has a magic signature that has
a taint bit of inferred return type ℓ for the function. In this
rule we use the function top with the standard meaning
to manipulate the stack content. Again since assert(∀v ′ ∈
pred(G, top(σL)). ℓ ⊑ v ′.Γ ′(reg0)) is checked at runtime, we
will have access to the stack.
ifthenelse For this rule we require that the security level
of conditional expression is not H. Checks on the goto and
ifthenelse guarantee that the program flow is secret inde-
pendent.
We say that a CFG G is well-typed (passes ConfVerify’s
checks), written ⊢ G , when two conditions hold for all nodes
v in (untrusted functions in) G: 1) The node (locally) satis-
fies the type system. Formally, G ⊢ v.Γ {v.pc} v.Γ ′, and
2) The ending taint of the node is consistent with the be-
ginning taints of all its successors. Formally, for all nodes
v ′ ∈ succ(G, v.pc), v.Γ ′ ⊑ v ′.Γ , where succ(G,pc) returns
the successors of the node labeled pc in G. We emphasize
again that only untrusted functions are checked.
Security theorem. The above checks are sufficient to prove
our key theorem: If a program passes ConfVerify, then
assuming that its trusted functions don’t leak private data,
the whole program does not leak private data, end-to-end.
We formalize non-leakage of private data as the standard
information flow property called termination-insensitive non-
interference. Roughly, this property requires a notion of low
equivalence of program configurations (of the same CFG G),
written s =L s ′, which allows memories of s and s ′ to differ
only in the private region. A program is noninterfering if
it preserves =L for any two runs, except when one program
halts safely (e.g., on a failed assertion). Intuitively, noninter-
ference means that no information from the private part of
the initial memory can leak into the public part of the final
memory.
For our model, we define s =L s ′ to hold if: (i) s and s ′
point to the same command, i.e., s .pc = s ′.pc , (ii) the contents
of their low-stacks are equal, s .σL = s ′.σL, (iii) for all low
memory addresses m ∈ µL, s .µ(m) = s ′.µ(m), (iv) for all
registers r such that G(s .pc).Γ (r ) = L, s .ρ(r ) = s ′.ρ(r ).
The assumption that trusted code does not leak private
data is formalized as follows.
Assumption 1. For all s0, s1, s ′0 such that s0 =L s1, if s0 ↪→f
s ′0 then ∃s ′1. s1 ↪→f s ′1 and s ′0 =L s ′1.
Under this assumption on the trusted code, we can show
the noninterference or security theorem. A necessary condi-
tion to show noninterference, however, is to ensure that no
well-typed program can reach an ill-formed configuration.
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Lemma 1. Suppose ⊢ G, for all configurations s of G it holds
that s ↛∗  .
Lemma 1 rules out possible nondeterminism caused by
adversarial behavior and allows to formalize the security
theorem as follows.
Theorem1 (Termination-insensitive noninterference). Sup-
pose ⊢ G . Then, for all configurations s0, s ′0 and s1 ofG such that
s0 =L s1 and s0 →∗ s ′0, then either s1 →∗ ⊥ or ∃s ′1. s1 →∗ s ′1
and s ′0 =L s
′
1.
When s0 and s ′0 are initial and final configurations, respec-
tively, then s1 and s ′1 must also be initial and final configura-
tions, so the theorem guarantees freedom from data leaks,
end-to-end (modulo assertion check failures).
C = ldr(reg, e) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ n n ∈ (Dom(µL)∪Dom(µH))
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ[reg 7→ µ(v)], [σ ], pc + 1⟩
C = ldr(reg, e) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ n n < (Dom(µL)∪Dom(µH))
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ →  
C = str(reg, e) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ n n ∈ (Dom(µL)∪Dom(µH))
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ[v 7→ ρ(reg )], ρ, [σ ], pc + 1⟩
C = str(reg, e) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ n n < (Dom(µL)∪Dom(µH))
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ →  
C = callU fu (e1, . . . , e4) (fu 7→ ⟨pcf , −⟩) ∈ F
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ, [(pc + 1);σL : σH], pc f ⟩
C = callT fτ (e1, . . . , e4) (fτ 7→ ⟨pcf , −⟩) ∈ F
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ ↪→fτ ⟨ν ′, µ′, ρ′, [(pc + 1);σ ′L : σ ′H], pcf ⟩
C = icall ef (e1, . . . , e4) µ, ρ ⊢ ef ⇓ pcf pcf ∈ G
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ, [(pc + 1);σL : σH], pcf ⟩
C = icall ef (e1, . . . , e4) µ, ρ ⊢ ef ⇓ pcf pcf < G
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ →  
C = ret adr ∈ G
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [adr ;σL :σH], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σL :σH], adr]⟩
C = ret adr < G
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [adr ;σL :σH], pc ⟩ →  
C = goto (e) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ pc
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc]⟩
C = ifthenelse (e, goto (e1) , goto (e2)) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ T µ, ρ ⊢ e1 ⇓ n1
⟨ν, µ, , ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], n1 ⟩
C = ifthenelse (e, goto (e1) , goto (e2)) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ F µ, ρ ⊢ e2 ⇓ n2
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], n2 ⟩
C = assert(e) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ T
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc + 1⟩
C = assert(e) µ, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ F
⟨ν, µ, ρ, [σ ], pc ⟩ → ⊥
Figure 9. Operational semantics rules.
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C = ldr(reg, e)
∀ v ∈pred(G, pc). v .C=assert(e ∈ Dom(µℓe ))
F, G ⊢ Γ {pc }Γ [r eд 7→ ℓe ]
C =str(reg, e) Γ ⊢ reg : ℓr ℓr ⊑ ℓe
∀v ∈pred(G, pc). v .C=assert(e ∈Dom(µℓe ))
F, G ⊢ Γ {pc }Γ
C = call{U|T} f (e1, . . . , e4) (f 7→ ⟨−, M_call⟩) ∈ F
Γ ⊢ ei : ℓi for i = 1 . . . 4 ℓ[1−4] ⊑ M_call
F, G ⊢ Γ {pc }Γ [rcaller 7→ H, rcallee 7→ L]
C = icall ef (e1, . . . ,e4) Γ ⊢ ef :ℓf ⊑ L Γ ⊢ ei :ℓi for i =1. . .4
∀v ∈ pred(G, pc). v .C=assert©­«
ℓ[1−4] ⊑ M_call and
ef ∈ G and
(ef 7→ ⟨−, M_call⟩) ∈ F)
ª®¬
F, G ⊢ Γ {pc }Γ [rcaller 7→ H, rcallee 7→ L]
C = ret Γ ⊢ rcallee ⊑L Γ ⊢ reg0 : ℓ
∀v ∈pred(G, pc). v .C=assert(∀v′ ∈pred(G, top(σL)). ℓ ⊑ v′.Γ ′(reg0))
F, G ⊢ Γ {pc } Γ
C = goto (e) Γ ⊢ e : ℓe ⊑ L
F, G ⊢ Γ {pc } Γ
C = ifthenelse (e, goto (e1) , goto (e2)) Γ ⊢ e : ℓe ⊑ L
F, G ⊢ Γ {pc } Γ
Figure 10. Complete list of type rules. C is a command from the
CFG node pointed to by pc and rcallee and rcaller are callee- and
caller-save registers.
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